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Abstract—In this paper, a general model for cyber-physical
systems (CPSs), that captures the diffusion of attacks from the
cyber layer to the physical system, is studied. In particular, a
game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the interactions
between one defender and one attacker over a CPS. In this
game, the attacker launches cyber attacks on a number of cyber
components of the CPS to maximize the potential harm to the
physical system while the system operator chooses to defend a
number of cyber nodes to thwart the attacks and minimize potential
damage to the physical side. The proposed game explicitly accounts
for the fact that both attacker and defender can have different
computational capabilities and disparate levels of knowledge of
the system. To capture such bounded rationality of attacker and
defender, a novel approach inspired from the behavioral framework
of cognitive hierarchy theory is developed. In this framework,
the defender is assumed to be faced with an attacker that can
have different possible thinking levels reflecting its knowledge of
the system and computational capabilities. To solve the game, the
optimal strategies of each attacker type are characterized and the
optimal response of the defender facing these different types is
computed. This general approach is applied to smart grid security
considering wide area protection with energy markets implications.
Numerical results show that a deviation from the Nash equilibrium
strategy is beneficial when the bounded rationality of the attacker is
considered. Moreover, the results show that the defender’s incentive
to deviate from the Nash equilibrium decreases when faced with
an attacker that has high computational ability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are characterized by a tight
interconnection between the physical system and its underlying
information and communication layers. Such a cyber-physical
interconnection introduces new security risks that significantly
differ from classical networked systems [1]–[3]. In fact, many
reports have discussed the vulnerability of a CPS to attacks and
the destructive effect that such attacks can have [4], [5].
CPS security has been the subject of various research works
recently [6]–[10]. The work in [6] characterizes a number
of sought CPS operational objectives under various potential
security threats. In [7], the authors propose a mathematical
framework for modeling and detection of various types of attacks
on a CPS. The authors in [8] propose a hierarchical security
architecture of CPS and develop a cross layer approach to
devise security solutions against attacks. Resilient control against
denial-of-service is studied in [9]. The work in [10] considers
cascading failures due to malicious attacks and devises a robust
defense strategy to protect the CPS against random attacks.
These research efforts have focused on general CPS security
problems that can be applicable to various CPS fields such as
the power grid and transportation systems. Meanwhile, several
recent works have focused on studying security threats tailored
to a specific domain, with a particular focus on the smart grid.
This work was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under
Grants ECCS-1549894 and CNS-1446621.
Securing the smart grid has indeed attracted significant attentions
such as in [3], [11] and [12]. In [3], the authors consider data
injection attacks on smart grids and devise a defense policy to
outcast such attacks. The work in [11] provides an analysis of
various security technologies to improve the robustness of the
smart grid against attacks. Along the same lines, the authors
in [12] analyze various cyber attacks on the smart grid and
propose solutions for improving its security.
While all these works provide interesting contributions to
the field of CPS and smart grid security, only few of them
consider the underlying strategic interaction between attackers
and defenders. In fact, an attacker typically aims at choosing
an attack strategy that would cause a damage to the system
while the defender aims at decreasing that damage caused by the
attack. Thus, the actions and objectives of a CPS attacker and
defender are intertwined which makes the study of their strategic
interaction necessary. Moreover, in the works that consider this
strategic behavior, as in [8] and [9], it is assumed that attackers
and defenders are fully rational players that can act optimally
and strategically. However, when faced with risks, incomplete
information, stress, and constraints such as limited time to act
and high involved complexity, as is the case of CPS security,
individuals tend to act with limited rationality [13]. Thus, such
bounded rationality needs to be explicitly accounted for when
analyzing the strategic interaction of the players within CPS
security situations for a better modeling of the attackers’ and
defenders’ actual behaviors.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a novel
framework for analyzing CPS and smart grid security, in the
presence of an attacker and defender with bounded rationality.
Given a general CPS model, the problem is formulated as a zero-
sum game between the attacker and defender that are interacting
over the cyber side of the CPS. In this game, the attacker
aims at launching cyber attacks on a number of cyber nodes
of the CPS to damage some of the physical components by
capitalizing on the diffusion of failures from the cyber to the
physical components. In contrast, the defender aims at defending
a number of cyber nodes to stop such attacks. Since the attacker
and defender can have different computational abilities and levels
of knowledge of the CPS, we propose a novel approach to
capture such bounded rationality inspired by the behavioral
framework of cognitive hierarchy theory [14]. Our proposed
framework considers that the defender can be faced, in practical
situations, with an attacker possessing one of various possible
levels of computational abilities and knowledge depth. Thus,
choosing a defense strategy while always assuming that the
attacker is a very complex strategic thinker, as in conventional
games [8], [9], is not always optimal. Hence, our bounded
rationality framework assumes that the defender can be faced
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Fig. 1. Cyber-Physical Interconnection.
with an attacker than can have one of many levels of thinking
reflecting the complexity of its used strategy. To solve this game,
we characterize the various levels of thinking of the attacker and
accordingly derive its optimal strategy. Moreover, the optimal
strategy of the defender is chosen to be the one that maximizes its
expected payoff given a probability distribution of the attacker’s
thinking levels.
As a case study, we consider a wide area protection scenario
in the smart grid. In this study, we focus on the economic effects
that a false disconnection of a transmission line can have on the
system. Our numerical results over the PJM-5 bus system show
that the defender can have an incentive to deviate from its Nash
equilibrium strategy knowing that the attacker can be acting with
bounded rationality. Moreover, these results also showcase the
effect that the probability of facing each attacker level has on
the optimal attack and defense strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces our general CPS security model as well as the
proposed game with bounded rationality. Section III presents
a case study focusing on wide area protection of the smart
grid illustrating our proposed model and game while Section IV
draws some conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
Consider a CPS composed of Nc cyber and Np physical nodes
that are strongly interdependent. Let C and P be, respectively,
the sets of cyber and physical nodes. In this model, security
breaches can spread from the cyber to the physical realms. As
illustrated in Fig. 1, we let rc,p be the interconnection between
a cyber node c ∈ C and a physical node p ∈ P . In fact, control
laws governing the operation of the physical system depend on
local and remote data collected by cyber nodes. Such data is
sent via communication channels to a supervisory control and
data acquisition system (SCADA) which, in turn, sends control
signals back to the cyber nodes initiating a control action over
the physical nodes. In this regard, rc,p is a weight that captures
the effect of the data sent by cyber node c on the control action
over physical node p. Accordingly, from a security perspective,
rc,p represents the probability that p fails due to corrupt data
sent by c. Hereinafter, we use “failed node” to refer to a cyber
node sending corrupt data. This failure of c can be due to a cyber
attack on this node or to other reasons such as a software bug
or a misconfiguration. Hence, rc,p can be expressed as rc,p =
Pr(p fails | c has failed), while ∑c∈C rc,p = 1.
Let pip be the probability of failure of p ∈ P due to failures
of a number of cyber nodes, and κc the probability of failure of
one of the cyber nodes c ∈ C. Accordingly, pip will be given by
pip =
Nc∑
c=1
rc,pκc. (1)
We denote by R the matrix of interconnections between cyber
and physical nodes, and pi = [pi1, ..., piNp ] ∈ RNp and κ =
[κ1, ..., κNc ] ∈ RNc the failure probability vectors of the physical
and cyber nodes, respectively. Accordingly, (1) can be rewritten
in matrix form as follows:
pi = κR. (2)
Each physical node p is associated with a cost of failure fp.
Hence, the expected total loss to the system, Ef , is given by:
Ef =
Np∑
p=1
pipfp. (3)
A. Game Formulation
In the absence of attacks, the probability of failure of each
cyber node is typically small and is only due to the presence of
software bugs or misconfiguration by, for example, maintenance
personnel. Thus, under no cyber attacks κ ≈ 0 and, thus, pi ≈ 0.
However, when a cyber node c is attacked, the probability of
failure of this node goes up to κc = 1. As a result, as seen
from (2), this attack increases the risk of failure of the physical
components that are interconnected to c thus increasing Ef as
per (3). On the other hand, defending c protects it from failures
in which case κc = 0 even when ck is attacked1. For example,
if an attacker induces a malware over a cyber node, when this
node is defended, the malware is detected and eliminated.
The attacker hence aims at maximizing Ef while the defender,
which is the system operator, aims at minimizing it. To ana-
lyze the optimal decision making of each of the attacker and
defender, we formulate a noncooperative zero-sum game [15]
Ξ = 〈I, (Si)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I〉. Here, I = {d, a} is the set of players:
defender (d) and attacker (a). Si is the set of actions available to
player i ∈ I which consists of choosing a subset of cyber nodes
to defend or attack. Let nd and na be the number of nodes that
can be, respectively, defended by the defender and attacked by
the attacker. Then, we have |Sd| =
(Nc
nd
)
and |Sa| =
(Nc
na
)
. Ui is
the utility function of player i ∈ I and is such that for si ∈ Si,
Ud(sd, sa) = −Ua(sd, sa) = −Ef , (4)
where Ef is given by (3).
B. Solution Concept
The most commonly adopted equilibrium concept for such
static noncooperative games is the Nash equilibrium (NE) [15].
In this regard, let γi ∈ Γi be a probability distribution over the
strategy set of player i where Γi is the set of all possible such
distributions. Thus, γi(s) represents the probability of player i
choosing strategy s ∈ Si while
∑
s∈Si γi(s) = 1. Accordingly,
each player’s expected utility is given by:
U¯d(γd,γa) = −U¯a(γd,γa)
= −
∑
sd∈Sd
∑
sa∈Sa
γd(sd)γa(sa)Ua(sd, sa). (5)
1Attack and defense are assumed to be always successful such that an attack
on c will certainly lead to its failure while defending c leads to its non-failure.
A best response strategy of a rational player i, γ∗i , is one that
maximizes its expected utility facing its opponent’s strategy, γ−i:
U¯i(γ
∗
i , γ−i) ≥ U¯i(γi, γ−i) ∀γi ∈ Γi. (6)
When every player plays a best response strategy against its
opponent’s strategy, the game reaches an equilibrium. Thus, the
strategy profile (γ∗i , γ
∗
−i) is a NE of the game when ∀i ∈ I [15]:
U¯i(γ
∗
i , γ
∗
−i) ≥ U¯i(γi, γ∗−i) ∀γi ∈ Γi. (7)
C. Notion of Bounded Rationality
The NE as defined in (7) assumes that both players are
strategic thinkers, act rationally, and have complete knowledge
of the game. However, when faced with risk and uncertainty, in-
dividuals are known to deviate from full rational behavior2 [13].
In fact, (7) requires every player to anticipate the exact cost,
fp, caused to the system due to the loss of each physical
component p ∈ P . With this knowledge, the attacker (defender)
can rank the physical components based on the magnitude of
their associated fp. Accordingly, each player can maximize (min-
imize) the harm caused to the system taking into consideration
the defense (attack) strategy that can be adopted by the opponent.
However, cyber-physical systems are known to be very complex
systems. Thus, obtaining such an exact ranking of the costs
caused by the loss of every component, fp, is highly complex.
As a result, in practice, the attacker and defender can build their
own perception of the vector of incurred losses f , denoted as fˆ
i
for i ∈ I, then take action accordingly. However, fˆ i can differ
from f . Moreover, the attacker and defender can have different
computational capabilities and thus can generate a different fˆ
i
based on their skill and computational levels. Thus, by following
its own perception, a player can deviate from full rationality
while choosing its optimal strategy. Consequently, this bounded
rationality can lead to deviations from the NE strategies.
To model such bounded rationality, we categorize each player
based on its level of thinking which is defined by how close is its
perception fˆ
i
to the actual f . Thus, high level thinkers are more
intelligent, have better knowledge, and superior computational
ability, allowing them to generate a closer perception to the real
f . Such a notion is inspired from the behavioral framework
of cognitive hierarchy (CH) [14] in which it is shown that
human players assume that they have the highest level of
thinking, denoted by level K, and that their opponents’ levels
of thinking are distributed over lower levels 0, ...,K − 1. In a
CH model, level 0 thinkers choose an action randomly from
their strategy space while higher level thinkers employ more
advanced levels of reasoning to choose their strategies. To model
the proportion of level k thinkers for k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1}, a
Poisson distribution, α(k), with mean and variance denoted by
λ is usually assumed [14]:
α(k) =
e−λλk
k!
. (8)
Given that the defender in our model is the system operator,
it can anticipate with full certainty f . In contrast, the attacker
2Even in the case of automated attack and defense, the high required compu-
tational ability and short time to act can lead to taking sub-optimal decisions.
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Fig. 2. PJM 5-bus System
might have a distorted fˆ which reflects its level of thinking and,
as a result, its chosen strategy. The defender, hence, has to choose
its optimal strategy while anticipating the possibility of facing an
attacker that can fall in any category k with a probability α(k).
As a result, the knowledge that the defender has about poten-
tial types of the attacker that it can face can give an incentive
for the defender to deviate from its NE strategy. In fact, this
anticipation of the various attacker types would change the best
response strategy of the defender from the NE strategy which
assumes that the defender faces only a fully rational attacker.
Moreover, since the attacker acts with bounded rationality based
on its thinking level, this attacker chooses the strategy that it
perceives to be optimal based on its own perception following
from its fˆ . Thus, the attacker also has an incentive to deviate
from the NE strategy. Consequently, our bounded rationality
framework showcases how in practical situations attackers and
defenders can deviate from the fully rational NE.
To give more elaboration of our proposed CPS model, game
formulation, and bounded rationality framework, we next analyze
in detail a case study focusing on the concept of wide area
protection of a smart grid with energy markets implications.
III. WIDE AREA PROTECTION IN THE SMART GRID
A. Smart Grid Wide Area Monitoring and Protection
In a smart grid, the concept of wide area monitoring, protec-
tion, and control relies on system-wide information sent from a
collection of cyber nodes to generate protective actions affecting
the status (i.e. connectivity) of the system’s physical components
to prevent the propagation of large disturbances [16]. The extent
to which the information sent by every cyber node affects the
status of each physical component can follow our proposed
model in Section II.
Consider the PJM 5-bus system shown in Fig. 2. This test
system comprises 5 generator units and 3 loads. All data per-
taining to this test system are available in [17]. The cyber nodes
C , {c1, ..., c12} collect real time data from around the system
and send them to the SCADA. The SCADA processes the data,
detects possible disturbances, and sends, in this event, protection
actions requiring the disconnection of a transmission line to
stop the propagation of the disturbance. The transmission lines,
P , {p1, ..., p6}, constitute the physical nodes of the system.
Accordingly, one of the purposes of this wide protection
concept is to disconnect physical components, such as transmis-
sion lines, to stop the propagation of a detected disturbance.
This is known as disturbance isolation. When the protection
system successfully isolates a disturbance, as per its design
requirements, the underlying protection scheme is known to be
“dependable” [18]. In addition, the protection system is required
to be “secure” which dictates that the system takes protective
actions only in the event of occurrence of anomalies [18]. Thus,
falsely disconnecting a component of the system during normal
operation is seen as a security breach.
To this end, a malicious attacker can target the security of
the system by compromising a number of cyber nodes na and
manipulating their sent data, to falsely trip a certain transmission
line. Here, κ = [κ1, ..., κ12] is the failure probability vector of
the 12 cyber nodes (i.e. probability of a cyber node sending false
data) and pi = [pi1, ..., pi6] is the vector of probabilities of a false
disconnection of a transmission line due to one, or multiple,
failures in the cyber system. The degree up to which a failure
on the cyber side leads to a disconnection of a transmission line
is captured by the matrix R in (2). Locally collected data give,
naturally, a better indication of the real-time operating state of a
transmission line and hence have the most significant effect on
the decision of disconnecting that line. Based on this observation,
we build R as follows. As shown in Fig. 2, each transmission
line is affected by data sent from 12 cyber nodes 2 of which are
locally connected to it. These local cyber nodes equally share a
50% effect on the decision to disconnect the line while the other
50% is split equally between the 10 remaining cyber nodes. As
a result, R, such that pi = κR, is represented as follows3:
ri,j =
{
0.25, if ci is locally connected to pj ,
0.05, otherwise.
Next, we focus on the cost of loss, fpi , of each physical
component pi ∈ P . A wrongful disconnection of a transmission
line can have detrimental effects on the operation and stability of
a power system. For example, the 1965 blackout of the Northeast
region of the United States and the Ontario province of Canada
was caused by a false trip of a transmission line [19]. As a result
of such incidents, power system operators adopted what is known
as the “n − 1 security criterion” which requires the system to
preserve its normal state of operation after the loss of one of its n
components [20]. Based on this reinforced security requirement,
a loss of one transmission line does not, typically, affect the
safety of a system under low stress operating conditions. Thus,
we will focus on another key effect of a false disconnection of
a transmission line, namely, the economic effect.
The economic dispatch of the smart grid is based on the
solution of an optimal power flow (OPF) problem. A typical OPF
problem formulation [21] is an optimization problem aiming at
minimizing the total generation cost of the system subject to a
set of equality and inequality constraints reflecting the system’s
operational requirements and physical limits.
To this end, consider V 0 to be the value function of the
original OPF problem, i.e. without loss of any transmission
line, and V pi to be the value function of the OPF with loss
of transmission line pi ∈ P . The value function of the OPF
problem reflects the total cost of generation spent to meet the
load and is normally expressed in $ per hour. Moreover, consider
3We use this representation of R as a numerical example of our proposed
model. Nonetheless, other numerical representations could have also been equally
adopted without affecting the validity of our model and underlying analyses.
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Fig. 3. Cost to the system incurred by the loss of each transmission line as
expressed in (9). TABLE I
ATTACKER’S PAYOFF Ua(sdi , s
a
j ), [UNIT: $1, 000]
HHHHd
a
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
p1 -38.82 -141.22 -142.30 -116.71 -110.49 -110.44
p2 -139.60 -38.69 -142.17 -116.58 -110.35 -110.31
p3 -139.50 -140.99 -38.59 -116.48 -110.26 -110.21
p4 -141.82 -143.31 -144.40 -40.92 -112.58 -112.53
p5 -142.39 -143.88 -144.96 -119.37 -41.48 -113.10
p6 -142.39 -143.88 -144.97 -119.37 -113.15 -41.49
T pi (expressed in hours) to be the time needed to bring back pi
into operation and CRpi (expressed in $) to be the cost of repair
of pi. Then, fpi will be given by:
fpi = (V
pi − V 0)T pi + CRpi . (9)
B. Numerical Results
For the considered PJM 5-bus system, to calculate fpi∀pi ∈ P ,
we run the optimal power flow seven different times to compute
{V0, V p1 , ..., V p6}. Also, we consider that every disconnected
transmission line needs 12 hours and costs $80, 000 to be brought
back into operation4. The results are shown in Fig. 3. As can
be seen from Fig. 3, disconnecting p3 incurs the highest cost
to the system ($131, 220) followed by p2, p1, p4, p5 and p6,
respectively.
In our case analysis, we consider that the attacker (de-
fender) aims at attacking (defending) a given transmission
line, pi ∈ P , by compromising (securing) the two cy-
ber nodes that have the most effect on this line. In other
words, for the considered game, the strategy space of the
defender and attacker can be defined as follows: Sd =
Sa = {(c1, c5), (c2, c10), (c3, c4), (c6, c7), (c8, c9), (c11, c12)}.
This corresponds to choosing to defend/attack one of the lines
in P . Thus, equivalently, Sd = Sa = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6}.
The defender and attacker aim at maximizing their expected
utility functions, U¯i, given by (5). The payoff Ud(sd, sa) of the
defender for the different sd ∈ Sd and sa ∈ Sa is presented in
Table I in which the row player is the defender and the column
player is the attacker5. The payoff of the attacker for the different
strategy combinations is the negative of that of the defender given
that the game is of zero-sum type.
When both players are strategic thinkers and have complete
information of the game, the NE in (7) can be found using
the von Neumann indifference principle [15]. Applying the von
4Such numbers are used as an example and are usually specific to the system
and to the line’s voltage level and length.
5The defender always has a negative payoff even when the attack is blocked. In
fact, with no attack, pic 6= 0 since cyber node ck can fail due to a software bug or
misconfiguration. In our numerical analysis we take picj = 1/12∀j = 1, ..., 12
prior to attack and defense. pic is small but not equal 0.
Neumann indifference principle we get the following equilibrium
results:
γ∗d = [0.2931, 0.3034, 0.3107, 0.0842, 0.0047, 0.0040], (10)
γ∗a = [0.1276, 0.1244, 0.1222, 0.1922, 0.2167, 0.2169]. (11)
This optimal strategy leads to U¯d = −$110, 240 and U¯a =
$110, 240.
On the other hand, as explained previously, the NE assumes
that both attacker and defender act strategically and have com-
plete information of the game. However, computing f requires
the solution of an OPF which is a complicated optimization
problem [22] that requires complete knowledge of the system.
The complexity of finding the solution of the OPF in practical
applications is thoroughly discussed in [22]. To this end, since
the defender is the system operator, it has complete knowledge
of the system and has the computational tools that are developed
specifically for the solution of the system’s OPF. On the other
hand, the attacker might not have neither the full knowledge of
the system nor the computational capabilities to solve the OPF
and compute fpi ∀pi ∈ P . In this case, the attacker must build a
perception of the ranking of fpi , for different pi ∈ P , to assess
which attack strategy is the most harmful to the system. Thus,
playing an NE defense strategy against an assumed fully rational
attacker might not be an optimal strategy given that the attacker
can deviate from its NE strategy due to its bounded rationality.
By applying the proposed model of Section II-C, we can
investigate deviations from the NE due to the bounded rationality
of the attacker. To this end, we consider that the attacker can take
one of three types reflecting three different “thinking levels” as
described in Section II-C. A level 0 attacker, denoted by l0, is one
that chooses an attack strategy randomly (following a uniform
distribution) from its strategy set Sa. A level 1 attacker, denoted
by l1, cannot generate OPF solutions but can observe the power
flow on each line (requires eavesdropping rather than solving the
computationally demanding OPF). Hence, an attacker l1 builds a
perception of the most harmful line to attack based on the level
of power flow on every line. A more loaded line, pi, is associated
with the largest fˆpi . Thus, an l1 attacker targets the line that is
the most loaded. A level 2 attacker, denoted by l2, is considered
to have full knowledge of the system and high computational
ability and can hence solve the OPF and compute fpi ∀pi ∈ P .
Thus, l2 can compute the exact f and attacks the line pi with
highest fpi .
In our model, the defender performs the highest thinking level
since it has the capability and knowledge to think strategically.
In fact, through historical data, the defender can build an
anticipation about the potential thinking levels that an attacker
may perform. Thus, the defender anticipates what the attack
strategy can be, based on a distribution of possible attacker’s
types, and plays a best response defense strategy that maximizes
its expected payoff. On the other hand, the attacker may not
be able to acquire such accurate knowledge about what the
defender’s strategy may be. Thus, the attacker forms a perception
of the harm that its attack can have. Then, the attacker bases its
attack on this perception since it assumes that the defender is
equally likely to defend any of the cyber nodes. In other words,
the attacker assumes the defender to be a level 0 thinker.
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Fig. 4. Defender’s expected utility when defending one of the lines pi ∈ P
facing an l0 attacker.
Next, we compute the best response strategy of the defender
when faced with an attacker belonging to one of the three types.
γlka corresponds to attacker lk’s attack strategy while γ
lk
d denotes
the best response of the defender against this strategy.
To this end, we first consider l0 which chooses a line to attack
randomly. Thus, its strategy is given by γl0a (sa) = 1/6∀sa ∈
Sa. To determine the best response of the defender facing an l0
attacker, we show, in Fig. 4, the expected utility of the defender
when choosing each of its possible strategies. By checking the
values of the achieved expected utility when defending a line pi
(dashed line in Fig. 4), one can see that the best response of
the defender against an l0 attacker is to choose to defend p3.
That is, γl0d (p3) = 1 and γ
l0
d (pj) = 0∀pj 6= p3 which results in
U¯ l0d (γ
l0
d , γ
l0
a ) = −U¯ l0a (γl0d , γl0a ) = −$109, 340.
Considering the case of an l1 attacker, its bounded ratio-
nality dictates to attack the line carrying the highest power
flow since a disconnection of such a line is perceived to
cause the highest harm to the system. Let ω be the vector
of power flows over lines {p1, ..., p6} with no disconnection
of any of these lines. Running an OPF of the PJM 5-bus
system results in the following flows expressed in MW : ω =
[252.38, 187.87, 230.25, 49.21, 24.95, 238.5]. Given that p1 bears
the highest power flow, γl1a consists of attacking line p1 with
probability equals to 1. Based on Table I, the defender’s best
response against γl1a is to choose to defend line p1 with proba-
bility 1 (γl1d (p1) = 1). These defense and attack strategies result
in U¯ l1d (γ
l1
d , γ
l1
a ) = −U¯ l1a (γl1d , γl1a ) = −$38, 830.
In contrast to l1, an l2 attacker has the ability and the
knowledge to solve the OPF and characterize the line with
highest fpi . As shown in Fig. 3, line p3’s loss is the most harmful.
Hence, γl2a consists of attacking line p3 with probability 1. The
best response of the defender to this strategy can be obtained
from Table I and consists of defending p3 with a probability
1 (γl2d (p3) = 1). These defense and attack strategies result in
U¯ l2d (γ
l2
d , γ
l2
a ) = −U¯ l2a (γl2d , γl2a ) = −$38, 590.
Given that the defender might be faced with an attacker from
any of the three types, it aims to devise an optimal strategy
that achieves the best expected utility facing the possible three
types. The probability that the attacker is of level lk is given
by α(k) in (8). As seen from (8), the ratio of probabilities of
level k + 1 to level k is a constant that we denote by τ . Thus,
α(1)/α(0) = α(2)/α(1) = τ . Using this relation and noting
that α(0) + α(1) + α(2) = 1, we can express α(0) as: α(0) =
1/(1 + τ + τ2).
From our derived best response expressions, γl0d , γ
l1
d and γ
l2
d ,
we know that the defender would defend line p3 when faced with
an l0 or l2 attacker while the defender would defend line p1 when
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Fig. 5. Defender’s expected utility when facing an attacker which can be of
types l0, l1, and l2.
faced with an l1 attacker. Given the defined probabilities of each
attacker’s type, we can calculate the expected payoff of the de-
fender when faced with an attacker lk , α(0)l0+α(1)l1+α(2)l2.
This latter notation means that lk corresponds to a combination
of types l0, l1 and l2 with probability α(0), α(1) and α(2),
respectively. Following from the expressions of U¯ l0d , U¯
l1
d and
U¯ l2d as well as from Table I, the expected utility of the defender
when defending p1 and p3 can be expressed as follows:
U¯d(p1, lk) = α(0)U¯d(p1, l0) + α(1)U¯d(p1, l1) + α(2)U¯d(p1, l2)
= −109.998α(0)− 38.823α(1)− 142.302α(2)
= −109.998α(0)− 38.823α(0)τ − 142.302α(0)τ2
U¯d(p3, lk) = −109.336α(0)− 139.489α(1)− 38.823α(2)
= −109.336α(0)− 139.489α(0)τ − 38.823α(0)τ2
As a result, the defender picks p1 when U¯d(p1, lk) >
U¯d(p3, lk), picks p3 when U¯d(p1, lk) < U¯d(p3, lk), and is
indifferent when U¯d(p1, lk) = U¯d(p3, lk). Thus, the defender
chooses the strategy, γlk∗d which results in U¯
∗
d (γ
lk∗
d , lk) =
max
(
U¯d(p1, lk), U¯d(p3, lk)
)
.
Fig. 5 shows the optimal expected utility achieved by the
defender when playing γlk∗d for an increasing ratio τ . Fig. 5
shows that the defender achieves a better expected utility, U¯∗d ,
when playing γlk∗d against γ
lk
a as compared to the NE utility
achieved when choosing γ∗d , in (10), against γ
lk
a . Thus, given
that the attacker can act with bounded rationality in security
applications, accounting for this bounded rationality has achieved
a better payoff for the defender as compared to playing the NE
strategy. For τ = 0.5, the defender achieves a 78% increase in
its expected utility by choosing γlk∗d instead of γ
∗
d . This increase
drops to 67% for τ = 1 and 55% for τ = 5. The value of τ
gives an indication about the probability of having a lower or
higher level attacker. In fact, τ < 1 indicates that a low level
attacker is more probable while τ > 1 indicates that a higher
level attacker is more probable. Thus, the general trend shows
that when the probability of a high level attacker increases, the
gain from deviating from the NE defense strategy decreases.
Moreover, it can be seen from Fig. 5, that the defender’s
optimal strategy is to defend p1 for approximately τ < 1 and
defend p3 for τ > 1. This implies that when it is more probable
to face a low level attacker, the defender optimally defends
against the targeted line, p1. In contrast, when facing a more
intelligent attacker is more probable, τ > 1, the defender’s
optimal strategy is to defend p3 which is the most probable target
of a high level attacker.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the security of the smart grid in
the presence of an attacker and defender. We have first introduced
a general CPS security model showing how attacks can propagate
from the cyber to the physical system. We have then formulated
the interaction between attacker and defender using a game-
theoretic model. In addition, we have introduced a bounded
rationality framework inspired by cognitive hierarchy theory that
is suitable to model the limited levels of thinking of the attacker.
We have applied our framework to the concept of wide area
protection of the smart grid and its energy markets implications.
We have shown that when considering bounded rationality of
the attacker, the defender can achieve a better protection of the
system. We have also shown that when the thinking level of the
attacker increases, the gain from deviating from the NE defense
strategy decreases.
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